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Understanding the evolution of cooperation remains a central concern in studies of animal behaviour,
with fundamental issues being how individuals avoid being cheated, or ‘short-changed’, and how
partners are chosen. Economic decisions made during social interactions should depend upon the
availability of potential partners nearby, as these bystanders generate temptations to defect from the
current partner. The inﬂuence of bystanders is highlighted in two theoretical approaches, biological
markets theory and parcelling, both economic models of behaviour. Here, we tested predictions of these
models using the grooming behaviour of wild male chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, living under strong
structural despotism, where grooming is exchanged both for agonistic support and for itself, and so we
provide the ﬁrst investigation of both presence and value of bystanders on chimpanzees' grooming
decisions. We found that male chimpanzees took into account the relative value (rank) of bystanders
compared to that of their current partner, with this more important than bystander numbers. High-
ranking bystanders appeared to generate incentives to defect from a potentially cooperative interac-
tion and we found that grooming effort was parcelled into discrete episodes, with smaller parcels used
when a bystander outranked the current partner. The number of bystanders also generated a temptation
to defect, as bidirectional (reciprocated) bouts were more likely to occur with fewer bystanders. Such
bouts were more likely with smaller rank distances between groomer and recipient. We found no in-
ﬂuence of grooming relationship on initial investment: groomers did not appear to trust that they would
receive grooming in return, even from those with whom they had a history of strongly reciprocal
grooming. Our ﬁndings are consistent with an economic-beneﬁts, markets-based approach, but not a
relationship model paradigm. Our work highlights the importance of considering the immediate social
context (number and quality of bystanders) in studies of cooperation.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/).
Understanding the evolution of cooperation remains a central
concern in studies of animal behaviour (Clutton-Brock, 2009; West
& Gardner, 2013; West, Grifﬁn, & Gardner, 2007). Two questions
have attracted particular attention: how an individual avoids being
cheated, or ‘short-changed’, and how individuals select partners.
For group-living species, choice of social partners is commonplace
(Connor, 1992, 1995a, 2007; Kutsukake & Clutton-Brock, 2010; No€e
& Hammerstein, 1994; No€e, van Schaik, & van Hooff, 1991; Smith,
Memenis, & Holekamp, 2007; Wubs, Bshary, & Lehmann, 2016).
Asymmetries exist between individuals such that the value of a
particular interaction may differ between participants, and in-
dividuals have opportunities to coerce cooperation or to punish
cheating (Clutton-Brock, 2009; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Jen-
sen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Mulder & Langmore, 1993; West &
Gardner, 2013; West et al., 2007).
Partner choice is highlighted in two particular theoretical
approaches, Connor's parcelling model (Connor, 1992; 1995b;
1995a; 2010), itself presaged by Friedman and Hammerstein
(1991), and No€e and colleagues' biological markets theory
(Hammerstein & No€e, 2016; No€e & Hammerstein, 1994, 1995; No€e
et al., 1991). Central to the parcelling model is the concept that the
presence of bystanders, individuals within the vicinity of a coop-
erating dyad but not otherwise participating, generates a tempta-
tion to defect from the current partner. In turn, this drives the
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parcelling (subdividing) of a social interaction by the actor, such
that its partner is forced into cooperating in order to extract sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁt from the interaction, while minimizing the actor's
costs should the partner defect, i.e. refuse to cooperate, or select
another partner. When individuals have easy opportunities to ﬁnd
alternative partners, such that the costs of searching are low, def-
ection is more likely to occur and the actor should give smaller
parcels in order to limit its losses (Connor, 1992, 1995a). Superﬁ-
cially similar to parcelling is raise-the-stakes (RTS: Roberts &
Sherratt, 1998). However, bystanders are not a feature of this
model: RTS actors are concerned solely with their investment, and
whether or not it is matched; the presence or absence of third
parties is irrelevant. To date, RTS has received little empirical sup-
port (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013).
Biological markets theory also incorporates the inﬂuence of
bystanders. It predicts that individuals should alter their invest-
ment in an interaction in relation to the availability of other po-
tential partners. If individuals cluster into discrete groups, those
who are close at hand, i.e. bystanders, form the local marketplace of
‘traders’ with whom an individual can interact (Kaburu & Newton-
Fisher, 2016a). The conditions of the local market may be more
important in inﬂuencing levels of investment than those of the
wider marketplace (the social group) due to search and opportu-
nity costs (No€e & Hammerstein, 1994). Unlike parcelling, however,
biological markets theory predicts only the total amount of in-
vestment as a function of market conditions, not the internal
structuring of interactions. Thus, while both parcelling and bio-
logical markets theory predict a bystander effect, the latter neither
predicts nor accounts for the division of behaviour into parcels.
Social grooming provides an excellent system with which to
explore such models of cooperation (Barrett, Henzi, Weingrill,
Lycett, & Hill, 2000, 1999; Frank & Silk, 2009; Fruteau, Lemoine,
Hellard, Noe, 2011; Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2015a; Machanda,
Gilby, & Wrangham, 2014; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011; de Waal,
1997; Watts, 2002). Social grooming is a behaviour found across a
variety of taxa, including ungulates (Mooring & Blumstein, 2004),
bats (Carter & Leffer, 2015), rodents (Stopka & Macdonald, 1999)
and birds (Radford, 2012), and is a prominent behaviour in
nonhuman primates (Dunbar, 1991; Henzi & Barrett, 1999; Russell
& Phelps, 2013; Schino, 2006). Time invested in grooming can
vary considerably within species, making this the ideal behaviour
with which to explore parcelling. Grooming provides the recipient
with a variety of beneﬁts including hygiene (Akinyi et al., 2013;
Mooring & Blumstein, 2004; Zamma, 2002), stress reduction
(Boccia, Reite, & Laudenslager, 1989; Shutt, MacLarnon,
Heistermann, & Semple, 2007) and thermoregulation (McFarland
et al., 2015), while the groomer has to endure possible energetic
and opportunity costs (Dunbar, 1992) as well as increased prox-
imity to a potentially aggressive group member (Schino &
Alessandrini, 2015). While these costs may be small, in some
cases perhaps trivial (Dunbar, 1988), or also incurred by the recip-
ient, ﬁtness is relative and even marginal gains may be important.
Where recipients are reproductive rivals of groomers, providing
these rivals with beneﬁts generates net costs for the groomer
(Newton-Fisher, 2014). Both parasite load and stress are driven by
factors extrinsic to an individual and so will accumulate with time,
creating an ongoing demand for grooming that varies between
individuals.
Under economic models such as biological markets theory and
parcelling, animals are viewed as following behavioural strategies
that lead them to behave as if they make partner-choice decisions
inﬂuenced by market conditions of supply and demand (Connor,
1992, 1995b; Hammerstein & No€e, 2016; Kaburu & Newton-
Fisher, 2015a; Kutsukake & Clutton-Brock, 2010; No€e & Hammer-
stein, 1994; No€e et al., 1991; Smith et al., 2007). Animals living in
social groups may trade grooming for commodities such as
agonistic support, valued food or social tolerance where these are
rank related or rank restricted (Barrett, Henzi, Weingrill, Lycett, &
Hill, 1999; Clutton-Brock, 2009; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995;
Jensen et al., 2007; Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2015a; Mulder &
Langmore, 1993; West & Gardner, 2013; West et al., 2007), and
‘grooming up the hierarchy’, a well-knownpattern in primate social
grooming, may be the result of lower-ranking individuals
attempting to access these commodities (Barrett et al., 1999; Henzi
& Barrett, 1999; Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2015a; No€e & Ham-
merstein, 1994, 1995; No€e et al., 1991; Schino, 2006). Alternatively,
grooming may be exchanged through varying degrees of reci-
procity, with individuals trading grooming in an effort to receive
grooming in return (Barrett et al., 1999; Hemelrijk & Ek, 1991;
Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011; Watts, 2002). When individuals have
easy opportunities to ﬁnd other partners and high-ranking in-
dividuals are close at hand, such that the costs of searching are low
and switching partners is beneﬁcial, the likelihood of defection (i.e.
lack of reciprocation) should increase. Individuals attempting to
trade grooming for itself should therefore adjust the amount of
grooming they give, especially at the beginning of a bout when they
are uncertain whether they will receive grooming in return, while
recipients should decide whether it is worth reciprocating their
partner's effort (Connor, 1992, 1995a; Kaburu & Newton-Fisher,
2016a). Faced with the risk of nonreciprocation, a parcelling strat-
egy will reduce the likelihood of, or limit losses in the event of, this
happening. The recipient's dominance rank, the availability of po-
tential partners nearby and the dominance ranks of these by-
standers could all affect both initial investment in a grooming bout
and the likelihood of reciprocity.
Increasing support for economic models such as biological
markets theory (Barrett et al., 2000; Clutton-Brock, 2009; Fruteau
et al., 2011; Fruteau, Voelkl, van Damme, & No€e, 2009; Gumert,
2007; Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2015a; Machanda et al., 2014;
McFarland et al., 2015; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011; Tiddi, Aureli, di
Sorrentino, & Janson, 2011; de Waal, 1997; Wei et al., 2012; West &
Gardner, 2013; West et al., 2007) represents a challenge to the
relationship model (Dunbar, 1988; Silk, Alberts, & Altmann, 2003),
which has been the dominant paradigm used to understand social
interactions in nonhuman primates. In this model, social in-
teractions such as grooming are seen as mechanisms to build re-
lationships that in turn deliver functional beneﬁts. The
fundamental difference between the two perspectives is not one of
timeframes (cf. Frank & Silk, 2009; Mitani, 2009b; Sanchez-Amaro
& Amici, 2015), an often-misunderstood aspect of market-based
approaches (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2016b), but the link be-
tween the behavioural interaction and ﬁtness. Under the relation-
ship model, ﬁtness beneﬁts derive from the relationships
established through interactions, whereas under a markets-based
approach ﬁtness beneﬁts derive from the interactions themselves.
The debate between these two perspectives remains unresolved.
Here we focus largely on testing predictions from biological
markets theory and parcelling, but we also test a prediction drawn
from the relationship model, and we consider our results from the
perspectives of both paradigms. We test the effects of both domi-
nance rank and bystander presence on grooming interactions
among wild male chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, of the Sonso
community of the Budongo Forest Reserve (Uganda). These chim-
panzees showed a strongly structurally despotic hierarchy at the
time of this study (hierarchy steepness ¼ 0.70: Kaburu & Newton-
Fisher, 2015a), more so than during an earlier study
(steepness ¼ 0.40) and when compared to other communities
(Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2015a). These chimpanzees used
grooming both to trade for rank-restricted commodities and as part
of grooming exchanges with varying degrees of reciprocity (Kaburu
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& Newton-Fisher, 2015a; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011). Our speciﬁc
focus is on the initial phase of grooming bouts, before the partner
reciprocates, as previous work suggests this is an important deci-
sion period for chimpanzees during which they assess the costs and
beneﬁts of continuing to invest in the bout (Kaburu & Newton-
Fisher, 2016a; Machanda et al., 2014). As in previous studies, and
following Barrett et al. (1999) and Manson, Navarrete, Silk, and
Perry (2004), we deﬁne a bout as an interaction rather than the
behaviour of a single individual, and thus one or both members of a
dyad could groom within a single bout (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher,
2015b, 2015a, 2016a; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011).
Chimpanzees are an ideal species for such an investigation, as
their ﬁssionefusion social system shufﬂes the identity and number
of community members within a subgroup or party so that the
number, and mix, of bystanders varies across opportunities for
grooming exchange. Spatial proximity between individuals
changes frequently and unpredictably (Newton-Fisher, 1999) such
that parties represent local markets separated by substantially
greater search costs than those required to ﬁnd alternative partners
within parties. In addition, chimpanzee grooming bouts can take
various and complex forms (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013;
Newton-Fisher, 2002b; Watts, 2000). Within a bout, grooming
effort (Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011) is typically broken up into short
episodes of varying number and duration, the exchange of which
can be highly dynamic. At its simplest, a bout consists of a single
episode of continuous unbroken grooming performed by one in-
dividual, but typically a groomer will perform a sequence of epi-
sodes interspersed by short breaks (<30 s: Newton-Fisher, n.d.). In
unidirectional bouts, this sequence of episodes terminates without
the recipient responding either because the groomer has stopped
or because the recipient departs. In bidirectional bouts, both in-
dividuals perform a sequence of episodes that may be asynchro-
nous, such that individuals alternate roles, or overlapping such that
grooming is simultaneous (mutual grooming). Sequences of
grooming episodes are typically not aligned or necessarily matched
in duration, so that most mutual grooming appears to result from
coincidental overlap, and can end or resume purely as the result of
individual grooming decisions. Many bouts include a combination
of these structures (Machanda et al., 2014). In only a small pro-
portion of bouts (e.g. 3% for the Sonso community, 1994e1995:
Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011) do individuals start simultaneously
and groom in this manner throughout. Our study community is
typical for chimpanzees in showing a mixture of unidirectional and
bidirectional grooming bouts.
We focus on grooming interactions of adult males as they
exhibit higher rates of grooming, and are more gregarious, than
adult females (Halperin, 1979; Wrangham & Smuts, 1980).
Furthermore, they engage in a broad range of cooperative behav-
iours such as support in agonistic interactions and sharing of food
(Goodall, 1986; Nishida, 2011) with social exchanges little inﬂu-
enced by kinship (Langergraber, Mitani, & Vigilant, 2007). Male
chimpanzees also demonstrate marked dominance relationships
and rank hierarchies (Hayaki, Huffman, & Nishida, 1989; Muller &
Wrangham, 2004; Newton-Fisher, 2004; Nishida & Hosaka, 1996),
and are direct reproductive rivals in that they compete with one
another for the same limited set of paternity opportunities (Boesch,
Kohou, Nene, & Vigilant, 2006; Inoue, Inoue-Murayama, Vigilant,
Takenaka, & Nishida, 2008; Newton-Fisher, Emery Thompson,
Reynolds, Boesch, & Vigilant, 2010; Vigilant, Hofreiter, Siedel, &
Boesch, 2001; Wroblewski et al., 2009).
With regard to the two paradigms, relationships versus direct
economics, key predictions of the relationship model as applied to
chimpanzee grooming have not been supported by recent work
(Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2016a; Machanda et al., 2014), yet while
there is some support for a biological markets model for
chimpanzee grooming (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2015a, 2015b,
2016a), not all predictions are supported (Newton-Fisher & Lee,
2011) and more work is needed. With these analyses, we provide
the ﬁrst investigation of the inﬂuence of both dominance rank and
bystanders on the grooming behaviour of wild male chimpanzees
under strong structural despotism. While we showed recently that
number of bystanders can inﬂuence the initial phase of grooming
among chimpanzees of another community (Kaburu & Newton-
Fisher, 2016a), those males exhibited a much ﬂatter, structurally
egalitarian hierarchy with shallow rank relationships (hierarchy
steepness ¼ 0.30), and did not trade grooming for agonistic support
(Kaburu&Newton-Fisher, 2015a). As a strong relationship between
grooming and coalitional support is considered typical for male
chimpanzees (Mitani, 2009a; Nishida & Hosaka, 1996; Watts,
2002), it is possible that the bystander effects that we reported
previously were due to unusual demographic or other conditions.
One aim of this study, therefore, was to determine the generality of
these previously reported ﬁndings.
From our consideration of the direct economic models, we
generated a series of predictions concerning the initial phase of
grooming bouts. First, we predicted that male chimpanzees should
groom for longer during this initial phase when recipients are
higher ranking than they are. Thus, with greater rank distance
between groomer and recipient, the groomer increases initial in-
vestment (prediction 1). We also predicted that initial investment
should be lower, and delivered in smaller parcels, with increasing
numbers of bystanders (prediction 2). Initial investment and parcel
size should be smaller when a bystander is high ranking (prediction
3), and when the high-ranking bystander outranks the current
recipient (prediction 4). Thus, individuals should groom less in the
initial phase if there are more bystanders and if a high-ranking
bystander is present (as such an individual should be an attrac-
tive option for defection from the current partner). We also pre-
dicted that subsequent grooming by the recipient within the bout
(i.e. the occurrence of a bidirectional bout) should be more likely
with fewer bystanders (prediction 5) and small rank distances be-
tween partners (prediction 6). We predicted that grooming bouts
should be more likely to be abandoned (resulting in a unidirec-
tional bout) by the groomer in the presence of more bystanders
(prediction 7) and with large rank distances between partners
(prediction 8).
To aid interpretation of our results under a relationship model
paradigm, we also investigated the effect of relationship (i.e.
grooming) history on the initial investment in grooming bouts.
Frequent or highly reciprocal grooming is commonly used as a
marker of strong, high-quality, afﬁliative relationships in
nonhuman primates (Mitani, 2009b; Silk et al., 2010). Therefore, we
predicted that if the relationship model holds, a groomer's initial
investment should be greater when grooming an individual who is
a frequent grooming partner and/or one with whom the groomer
has a history of reciprocal grooming (prediction 9), as either or both
of these measures of prior grooming history indicate the likelihood
that the groomer's investment will be returned. Predictions and the
outcomes of our tests are summarized in Table 1.
METHODS
We collected data from December 2003 to August 2004 in the
Sonso region of the Budongo Forest Reserve in western Uganda.
Chimpanzees, P. t. schweinfurthii, of the study community were
habituated in 1994, and have been studied continuously ever since
(Newton-Fisher, 1997; Reynolds, 2005). At this time, the Sonso
community consisted of 63 individuals, including eight adult males
( 16 years old) and 21 adult females ( 14 years old) (Emery
Thompson, Newton-Fisher, & Reynolds, 2006). This research
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complied with regulations set by the Ethics Committee of the
University of Kent, the protocols of the Budongo Forest Project
(now BCFS) and the legal requirements of Uganda.
Data on grooming and agonistic interactions were collected
using all-occurrence sampling (Altmann, 1974) within focal parties
(i.e. all occurrences of these interactions that occurred in a party
that contained a nominal focal animal, where ‘party’ is the sub-
group produced by the ﬂuid ﬁssionefusion social system). Parties
were followed for as long as possible from ﬁrst encounter until
nesting; focal animals were identiﬁed to allow unbiased decisions
onwhich animals to observe when parties ﬁssioned. If contact with
chimpanzees was lost due to terrain and/or chimpanzee movement
patterns, we searched for and observed the next party encountered
containing one of the predetermined focal animals. We recorded a
total of 1109.5 h of observation over 159 days/follows (median per
day¼ 7 h). Individual adult males were under observation for a
mean (±SD) of 358.8 ± 74.5 h (median ¼ 356.7 h). We used 5 min-
interval instantaneous scan sampling to record the identities of
individuals present in the same party as the focal animal (i.e. as-
sociation) as well as their activity (i.e. resting, grooming, travelling
or feeding) every 10 min. We deﬁned a party operationally as a
cluster of independently associating individuals with a maximum
radius of around 35 m, showing coordination in behaviour
(Newton-Fisher, 1999). Participation in ‘pant-hoot’ choruses was
used to conﬁrm this deﬁnition, as this provided an active demon-
stration of coordination (Mitani & Nishida, 1993).
We deﬁned grooming as the visual examination, searching and
manipulation of the skin and hair with one or both hands, with the
aid occasionally of the lower lip. Grooming bouts consisted of one
or more episodes, with an episode deﬁned as a period of unbroken
continuous grooming by one individual, ending when the groomer
removed both hands from his partner's body (Barrett et al., 2000;
Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013, 2016a). A bout was deemed to
have ended when both members of the dyad engaged in activities
other than grooming, including resting, for at least 30 s after the
last social grooming movement by either individual (Newton-
Fisher & Lee, 2011). For all bouts, we recorded: (1) the identity of
the individual who approached the partner either to give or receive
grooming, and time of the approach; (2) changes in the identity of
groomer and recipient; (3) start and end times of each grooming
episode, and thus the total bout; and (4) how the bout ended (i.e.
whether terminated by groomer or recipient). We excluded from
analysis bouts where partners started grooming each other
simultaneously (N ¼ 45 bouts). We also excluded those that started
prior to observation, and those that could not be accurately
observed due to poor visibility.
We deﬁned the initial phase of the bout as the period from
initiation until either the bout ended (resulting in a unidirectional
bout) or the receipt by the initiator of grooming from his partner (a
bidirectional bout). The total duration of grooming performed in
this phase we refer to as the initial investment in the bout. Any
phase of grooming may consist of multiple episodes, each a period
of unbroken continuous grooming by a single individual. We regard
each episode as a putative parcel, and so refer to the mean duration
of episodes (here, within an initial phase) as the parcel size.
Individuals in the party at the start of a grooming interaction but
not part of the grooming dyad were deﬁned as bystanders. Since
the number of bystanders may be contingent on the context in
which grooming occurs, we extracted from the scan samples the
activities of all adult males in the party prior to the beginning of
each bout. We classiﬁed four contexts: feeding, resting and trav-
elling, where this was the activity of all the males in the party
(individuals who were grooming were classiﬁed under ‘resting’),
and mixed, where males were engaged in multiple activities. We
also noted whether the grooming bout was interrupted by
aggression, either from third parties or by one of the participants in
the grooming bout.
As grooming in chimpanzees is not restricted to dyadic in-
teractions, but can develop into triadic or larger chains and clusters
(Goodall, 1986; Nakamura, 2000), an individual initiating a
grooming bout can do so with another who is already occupied
with a grooming partner. We considered members of these
grooming chains, as well as other individuals also involved in
grooming, to be bystanders as they clearly represented possible
alternative partners for the initiators. Thus we did not distinguish
between recipients who were already engaged in a grooming
interaction, and those who were not. While in principle this
grooming by third parties may inﬂuence the behaviour of both
initiator and recipient, we found no difference in our substantive
results whether we ran our analyses including all grooming bouts
or including only bouts that were neither part of grooming chains
nor occurring when bystanders were engaged in their own
grooming. In the interests of brevity, we present only results from
the more inclusive data set.
We used directed aggressive interactions to determine relative
social dominance (Newton-Fisher, 2017).We distinguishedwinners
and losers from the outcome of each interaction, in particular using
behaviours such as screaming, cowering or running away, or
receiving but not returning physical violence and/or wounds, to
identify the loser. Interactions that escalated, such that they con-
sisted of multiple acts of aggression, were considered as single
interactions. We discarded aggressive behaviours that provoked no
response from the target, judging these to be ineffective in inﬂu-
encing social dominance relationships. We used these data to
calculate Elo-ratings (Albers & de Vries, 2001) using the R function
‘elo.sequence’ (Kaburu, Inoue, & Newton-Fisher, 2013; Neumann
et al., 2011; Newton-Fisher, 2017). This allowed us to track rank
over time, and to determine dominance ranks of interacting males
on any day for which grooming was recorded. We included in this
analysis aggression performed as part of a coalition, as we have no
reason to assume that such aggression would not result in the
winner/loser effects assumed by the Elo-rating method. Following
convention, ordinal rankings assigned a value of 1 to the highest-




With greater rank distance to the recipient, the groomer should:
(1) increase initial investment Supported
With more bystanders, the groomer should:
(2a) decrease initial investment Not supported
(2b) decrease parcel size Not supported
When a bystander is high-ranking, the groomer should:
(3a) decrease initial investment Supported
(3b) decrease parcel size Supported
With greater rank distance between current recipient and the highest-ranking
bystander, the groomer should:
(4a) decrease initial investment Supported
(4b) decrease parcel size Not supported
Reciprocation of grooming by the recipient (a bidirectional bout) is more
likely when:
(5) there are fewer bystanders Supported
(6) groomer and recipient are similar in rank Supported
Groomers are more likely to abandon grooming in the initial phase:
(7) when there are more bystanders Not supported
(8) rank distance between groomer and recipient is large Not supported
If the relationship model holds, the groomer's initial investment should be
greater among dyads who, prior to this bout:
(9a) groomed frequently Not supported
(9b) strongly reciprocated grooming Not supported
Outcomes that support predictions are shown in bold.
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values indicating lower-ranked individuals. We conﬁrmed ranks
were consistent with the direction of pant-grunt vocalizations
(performed by subordinates towards dominants: Bygott, 1979;
Goodall, 1986). We determined rank distance by subtracting the
(ordinal) rank of the recipient from the (ordinal) rank of the
groomer, so positive rank distances in the analysis below corre-
spond to grooming directed from subordinates to dominants.
We used mixed-model analysis to test our predictions. We used
the function ‘lmer’ for linear mixed models (LMM) and ‘glmer’ for
generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a binomial struc-
ture, from the R package ‘lme4’. We used the ‘drop1’ function to
compute a likelihood ratio test and thereby assess whether the
independent factor(s) exerted a signiﬁcant effect on the dependent
variable. We used random-intercept models that included the
identities of both initiator and recipient as random factors with
crossed structure, to control for repeated observations of in-
dividuals and possible idiosyncratic behavioural tendencies.
To test whether rank distance (prediction 1) and number of
bystanders (prediction 2) affected initial phase grooming, we
constructed two separate LMMs: one with initial investment (total
duration) and one with parcel size (mean episode duration) as the
dependent variable. In both models, we included the number of
bystanders (continuous), rank distance between groomer and
recipient (continuous), context (categorical) and whether the bout
was interrupted (binomial) as ﬁxed factors.
To test whether the presence of a high-ranking bystander
resulted in lower initial investment and smaller parcel size, we
constructed further LMMs with these as separate dependent vari-
ables, and absolute (ordinal) rank of the highest-ranked bystander
(prediction 3) and the rank distance between this male and the
recipient (prediction 4) as ﬁxed factors. As above, we also included
context and whether a bout was interrupted as ﬁxed factors.
Necessarily, we excluded bouts in which there were no male by-
standers from this analysis.
To test whether the number of bystanders (prediction 5) or the
rank distance within the grooming dyad (prediction 6) inﬂuenced
participation in the bout by the recipient (i.e. the occurrence of a
bidirectional bout), we constructed a GLMM with outcome (uni-
directional or bidirectional bout) as the dependent variable, and
rank distance between partners, number of bystanders, context and
whether the bout was interrupted as ﬁxed factors. In this analysis,
we used the absolute value (modulus) of rank distance, as we were
interested speciﬁcally in testing the effect of whether individuals
were close or distant in rank. To test whether groomers were more
likely to abandon grooming in the initial phase if more bystanders
were present (prediction 7), or if rank distances between groomer
and recipient were large (prediction 8), we constructed a second
GLMM with the role of the individual terminating the initial phase
(groomer versus recipient) as the dependent variable, and the
number of bystanders, within-dyad absolute rank distance, the
context and whether the bout was interrupted as ﬁxed factors. In
this second GLMM, we restricted analysis to unidirectional bouts
(given our focus on the initial phase we did not examine re-
sponsibility for ending bidirectional bouts).
To test prediction 9, we calculated the grooming history for each
dyad in the month prior to each grooming bout in our data set, as
both the frequency (number of bouts) and the degree of grooming
reciprocity. This approach was preferable to calculating measures
across our data set, as that would conﬂate both prior history and
future events relative to each grooming bout and the choices or
decisions made therein. We reasoned that a period of a single
month should be sufﬁcient to capture recent prior history and thus
the state (or quality) of the relationship: if such relationships are
stable, then these measures should be similar whether sampled
over the preceding month or over longer timeframes. If these
relationships are unstable, data accumulated over a longer period
risk misrepresenting the state of the relationship at the time of any
particular grooming interaction, and this risk increases with the
length of accumulation period (a similar problem is faced by
traditional methods of determining dominance relationships:
Newton-Fisher, 2017). However, we also ran these analyses using a
2-month prior history, but as our results were no different we
report only those using the 1-month period. We excluded from
these analyses any bout where the dyad had not been recorded as
grooming in the previous month.
We calculated frequency as the number of bouts recorded
relative to the time that bothmales were present in the same party;
for the degree of grooming reciprocity, we calculated the reci-
















in which gAb is the grooming that individual A directed towards B,
gBa is the grooming that B directed towards A and gAb þ gBa is the
total grooming exchanged between A and B. This index ranges from
0 (no reciprocity) to 1 (complete reciprocity). We constructed two
LMMs, each with initial investment as the dependent variable, and
with either grooming frequency or the reciprocity index (RI) as the
ﬁxed factor. As above, we included the identities of groomer and
recipient as random factors in both models.
RESULTS
We analysed 377 bouts (39.9 h of grooming), collectively con-
taining 14.5 h (52 210 s) of initial-phase grooming. Mean duration
of grooming (±SD) was 138.5 ± 180.1 s (median ¼ 80 s):
149.6 ± 191.3 s (median ¼ 86 s) in unidirectional bouts (by deﬁni-
tion, this is equal to the total bout) and 89.7 ± 98.8 s
(median ¼ 50.5 s) for the initial phase of bidirectional bouts. The
initial phase of unidirectional bouts consisted on average of
2.3 ± 2.2 episodes (median ¼ 2; range 1e19), 64.4 ± 55.7 s
(median ¼ 47 s) in duration. The initial phase of bidirectional bouts
consisted on average of 1.8 ± 1.5 episodes (median ¼ 1; range 1e8),
50.5 ± 57.5 s (median ¼ 41.1 s) in duration. Only 6% of bouts were
interrupted (N ¼ 24), and the likelihood of interruption was not
related to the number of male bystanders (b ± SE: 0.013 ± 0.147,
Z ¼ 0.092, P ¼ 0.926). Most grooming occurred in a resting context
(73%), with fewer bouts occurring during mixed (18%), travelling
(6%) or feeding (2%) contexts. Seventy per cent (N ¼ 263) of bouts
were initiated by lower-ranking towards higher-ranking males, and
75% of initial-phase grooming (10.9 h) was directed from sub-
ordinates to dominant partners (binomial test: P < 0.001).
Furthermore, the dominance rank of recipients was on average
signiﬁcantly higher (mean Elo-rating: 2100) than that of the most
dominant male among bystanders (mean Elo-rating: 1994; Man-
neWhitney signed-rank test: V ¼ 34 914, P ¼ 0.003), suggesting
that male chimpanzees tended to select the highest-ranking male
available when initiating grooming.
Results of the mixed-model analyses testing predictions 1e8 are
presented in full in Tables 2e4. Here, we provide a summary of key
ﬁndings in relation to our predictions. A groomer's initial invest-
ment was signiﬁcantly predicted by within-dyad rank distance
(P ¼ 0.028) supporting prediction 1: subordinates tended to invest
more in the initial phase of a bout than did dominants, with this
difference increasing with the rank distance between partners
(Fig. 1). The number of male bystanders, however, did not predict
the groomer's initial investment so we found no support for pre-
diction 2. Similarly, neither context nor interruptions were signif-
icant inﬂuences on the level of initial investment. None of these
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factors affected parcel size, as measured by mean episode duration
(Table 2). However, we did ﬁnd that dominance rank of the highest
ranking of the male bystanders predicted both initial investment
(P ¼ 0.010) and parcel size (P ¼ 0.010; Fig. 2). Rank distance be-
tween this highest-ranking bystander and the current recipient of
the grooming also signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced initial investment
(P ¼ 0.007; Fig. 3), although it did not affect parcel size (Table 3).
These results indicate that groomers tended to invest less in the
initial phase through shorter episodes when at least one male
bystander was of higher rank than the current recipient, and that
this effect was stronger where the difference was greater, sup-
porting predictions 3 and 4.
Both number of bystanders (P ¼ 0.013; Fig. 4) and (absolute) rank
distance (P ¼ 0.016) predicted the occurrence of within-bout recip-
rocation: bidirectional bouts were more likely when grooming
partners were similar in rank, and when there were fewer by-
standers, supporting prediction 5 and prediction 6, respectively. We
found no evidence that a groomer's decision to abandon a bout
(resulting in a unidirectional bout) was inﬂuenced by the rank dis-
tance to the recipient or numberof bystanders (Table 4). Thus,wedid
not ﬁnd support for either prediction 7 or prediction 8. Finally, we
found no support for prediction 9: initial investment was not pre-
dicted by grooming relationship history, taken either as frequency of
bouts (LMM: b ± SE: 42.91 ± 76.03, t ¼ 0.564, P ¼ 0.521;
mean ± SD frequency of grooming per month¼ 0.14 ± 0.12 bouts/h
of observation) or degree of reciprocity (LMM: b ± SE:
9.618 ± 25.831, t ¼ 0.372, P ¼ 0.925; mean ± SD reciprocity index
per month¼ 0.49 ± 0.38).
DISCUSSION
In the Sonso community, the presence of high-ranking by-
standers and the total number of bystanders both appeared to
generate incentives to defect from potentially cooperative in-
teractions. The amount of grooming that adult male chimpanzees
of this community were willing to invest at the beginning of a bout
increased with the rank distance between groomer and recipient:
the lower ranking a groomer was relative to his partner, the more
he would groom in the initial phase. Unlike our previously reported
ﬁnding from M-group (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2016a), this in-
vestment was not inﬂuenced by the number of bystanders. It was,
however, inﬂuenced by the presence of high-ranking bystanders:
males provided less grooming in the initial phase when there was a
high-ranking bystander, and when the difference between the rank
of this bystander and the current recipient was greater. The number
of bystanders was important in inﬂuencing whether an initial
phase of grooming developed into a bidirectional bout, as these
bouts were more likely when the number of bystanders was small,
as well as when rank distances between groomer and recipient
were small.
The extreme degree of structural despotism shown by the males
of the Sonso community during this study appeared to have a
strong inﬂuence on grooming investment strategies. Such condi-
tions reﬂect marked rank differences and the degree to which rank-
related commodities such as agonistic support or tolerance are
restricted to high-ranked individuals. In contrast to our ﬁndings for
the substantially more structurally egalitarian M-group, the inﬂu-
ence of bystanders on the grooming strategies of Sonso community
males was mediated by a strong effect of dominance rank. These
communities were of comparable size (Sonso: 63 individuals; M-
group: 60 individuals) with a similar number of adult males (Sonso:
8; M-group: 10), and data were collected using comparable para-
digms and for similar periods (Sonso: 1109.5 h; M-group: 800.9 h,
both over 9 months). The two communities differed, however, in
the number of males aged between 20 and 30 years (Sonso: 3; M-
group: 7), a demographic variable that predicts hierarchy steepness
across chimpanzee communities (Kaburu&Newton-Fisher, 2015a).
In structurally despotic societies, high-ranking individuals either
control access to commodities that low ranking individuals desire,
or have the ability to extort grooming from low-ranking in-
dividuals. The apparent attraction, real or forced, of such in-
dividuals as grooming partners for nonhuman primates is not
surprising (Bygott, 1979; Schino, 2006; Seyfarth, 1977, 1980;
Simpson, 1973). What is novel, however, is our demonstration
that the rank of bystanders, relative to the rank of the current
Table 2
Mixed-model analyses (LMM) showing the effect of number of male bystanders and
rank distance on the duration of groomer's initial investment and parcel size
Dependent Predictor b SE t P
Initial investment Intercept 96.399 38.456 2.506
Rank distance 8.649 3.540 2.443 0.028
No. of bystanders 6.493 6.390 1.016 0.344
Context 24.533 16.751 1.465 0.127
Interrupted 24.365 38.662 0.630 0.517
Parcel size Intercept 56.138 13.109 4.282
Rank distance 1.100 1.217 0.904 0.426
No. of bystanders 3.508 1.988 1.765 0.082
Context 3.805 5.203 0.731 0.454
Interrupted 22.031 12.179 1.809 0.077
Initial investment is deﬁned as duration of grooming in the initial phase; parcel size
is deﬁned as the mean episode duration. Signiﬁcant results are presented in bold.
Table 3
Mixed-model analyses (LMM) showing the effect of the highest-ranking bystander's
rank, and the rank distance between this individual and the recipient, on both the
groomer's initial investment and parcel size
Dependent Predictor b SE t P
Initial
investment
Intercept 37.370 40.191 0.930
Highest bystander rank 16.766 6.133 2.734 0.010
Context 29.097 17.076 1.704 0.090
Interrupted 20.658 41.134 0.502 0.654
Initial
investment
Intercept 80.881 34.603 2.337
Rank distance ¡11.168 3.927 ¡2.844 0.007
Context 28.757 17.053 1.686 0.090
Interrupted 31.822 41.052 0.775 0.437
Parcel size Intercept 32.233 12.441 2.591
Highest bystander rank 4.707 1.797 2.620 0.010
Context 5.867 5.121 1.146 0.252
Interrupted 18.131 12.479 1.453
Parcel size Intercept 46.857 11.063 4.235
Rank distance 1.238 1.384 0.895 0.351
Context 4.930 5.165 0.955 0.337
Interrupted 19.386 12.572 1.542 0.133
Initial investment is deﬁned as duration of grooming in the initial phase; parcel size
is deﬁned as the mean episode duration. Signiﬁcant results are presented in bold.
Table 4
Mixed-model analyses (GLMM) showing the effect of the number of male by-
standers and rank distance on the occurrence of bidirectional bouts and on the
identity of the individual who terminated the bout
Dependent Predictor b SE z P
Occurrence of
bidirectional bout
Intercept 0.439 0.824 0.532
Rank distance ¡0.328 0.136 ¡2.418 0.016
No. of bystanders ¡0.266 0.108 ¡2.476 0.013
Context 0.007 0.278 0.024 0.981
Interrupted 0.801 0.544 1.472 0.141
Who terminates bout? Intercept 1.178 0.675 1.746
Rank distance 0.070 0.096 0.722 0.470
No. of bystanders 0.063 0.110 0.576 0.564
Context 0.254 0.272 0.936 0.349
Interrupted 0.299 0.677 0.442 0.658
Signiﬁcant results are presented in bold.
N. E. Newton-Fisher, S. S. K. Kaburu / Animal Behaviour 128 (2017) 153e164158
partner, is taken into account when making grooming investment
decisions, and furthermore that such rank considerations appear to
be more important than the number of bystanders when structural
despotism is high. We found that rank was less important in the
more structurally egalitarian M-group, where it affected only the
length of grooming episodes, and subordinates did not direct a
greater proportion of their grooming towards dominants (Kaburu&
Newton-Fisher, 2015a). Sensitivity to bystander ranks has been
shown in agonistic decision making (e.g. Engh, Siebert, Greenberg,
& Holekamp, 2005; Kitchen, Cheney, & Seyfarth, 2005; Perry,
Manson, Muniz, Gros-Louis, & Vigilant, 2008; Silk, 1999; Slo-
combe& Zuberbuehler, 2007); herewe showed this in an afﬁliative
context. The importance of our results are: (1) that we demon-
strated that an inﬂuence of bystanders on grooming decisions is
generalizable across populations with differing dominance hierar-
chies and not an artefact of the egalitarian group structure in our
previous study (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2016a), and perhaps
more importantly (2) that the nature of bystander inﬂuence differs
in the manner predicted by biological markets theory. Given the
broad reach of biological markets theory, these results have im-
plications beyond our study species.
These ﬁndings strengthen our previous suggestion (Kaburu &
Newton-Fisher, 2016a) that the spatially dispersed subgroups
operate as local markets when it comes to grooming decisions: that
is, the opportunity and search (or sampling) costs (No€e &
Hammerstein, 1994) associated with selecting social partners
from other parties bias individuals tomake decisions based on their
immediate social environment. With high sampling costs, such
local markets may become isolated, but whether they do so should
depend on individuals weighting the potential gains from cooper-
ating with a partner chosen from the current array against the
expected average returns from the supply in the global market,
devalued by sampling costs.
Our ﬁnding that bouts were more likely to be bidirectional, with
the initiator's investment reciprocated to some degree, when the
number of alternative partners was low suggests that the costs
incurred by male chimpanzees searching for new partners in other
parties must be relatively high, leading to strong discounting with
decisions made largely on the basis of the current party composi-
tion. It also supports the hypothesis that male chimpanzees may
form small parties to facilitate prolonged grooming interactions
(the tactical association hypothesis: Newton-Fisher, 1999). Our
ﬁnding that male chimpanzees evaluate both (1) their rank relative
to the highest-ranking adult male bystander and (2) the rank of this
individual relative to that of the current recipient of their grooming
shows that they not only select a partner close at hand, but also
appear to weigh their options from this current array of potential
partners.
However, the ﬁssionefusion dynamics in chimpanzee society
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Figure 1. Relationship between rank distance (rank of groomer  rank of recipient) and initial investment (duration of grooming, s) in the bout by the groomer (the individual
initiating the bout), prior to any response by the recipient. Data points represent individual grooming interactions. The dashed line is the relationship predicted by linear mixed
modelling (Table 2).
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interact with members of other parties. While cooperation is not
the only reason individuals might seek new social environments,
this ﬂexibility to change associates might suggest that sampling
costs related to selecting social partners are both variable and not
necessarily prohibitive. The extent to which partner choice de-
cisions are inﬂuenced by social opportunities elsewhere remains to
be determined, as does the degree to which searching for other
parties is costly for male chimpanzees, as well as how such costs are
inﬂuenced by knowledge of the location of other individuals, for
example from recent association, predictable ranging patterns
(Murray, Gilby, Mane, & Pusey, 2008; Newton-Fisher, 2002a, 2000)
or vocal signals (Mitani & Nishida, 1993).
While ﬁssionefusion dynamics shown by chimpanzees provide
an obvious opportunity to explore the concept of local markets,
such market structuring should exist in other species (e.g. long-
tailed macaques Macaca fascicularis: Gumert, 2007). Where social
groupings are more cohesive, interindividual proximity may be an
important factor in generating local market conditions within these
groups. The relatively small effect of the number of bystanders for
the chimpanzees in this study may have been due, in part, to the
spatial arrangement of males within parties (Newton-Fisher, 1997)
and considering interindividual distances, and the dynamics of
these, will be an important reﬁnement for future studies.
Our results also support the hypothesis that chimpanzees make
use of a parcelling-like strategy in their grooming (Kaburu &
Newton-Fisher, 2016a; Machanda et al., 2014), with grooming
investment in the initial phase varying in a manner consistent with
the predictions of Connor's parcelling model (Connor, 1992; 1995a,
1995b, 2010). In parties containing an adult male who outranked
both the groomer and recipient, the groomer reduced the length of
episodes (parcel size) and initial investment as predicted by Con-
nor's model. However, our predictions regarding the number of
bystanders were not supported.
Asmight be expected given the level of structural despotism, the
presence of a high-ranking male appeared to generate an incentive
to defect from a potentially cooperative interaction (bouts were
more likely to end without reciprocation in the presence of such
individuals), while the presence of multiple lower-ranked males
was not relevant to these grooming decisions (unfortunately, we
were not able to determine whether groomers limited their in-
vestment to encourage reciprocation or to cut losses that they
might incur). A possible alternative explanation is that shortening
of episodes might, instead, have been an indication of increased
vigilance, given that grooming potentially distracts animals from
the presence of predators or aggressive group members
(Maestripieri, 1993; Mooring & Hart, 1995). Male chimpanzees will
disrupt grooming interactions, especially during periods of social
instability (Nishida & Hosaka, 1996; de Waal, 1982), and we re-
ported previously that male chimpanzees of M-group performed
shorter grooming episodes during a period of social instability
when aggression rates were high (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013).




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8









Figure 2. Relationship between the rank of the highest ranking of bystanders to a grooming bout and the size of grooming parcels (mean duration, s, across grooming episodes in
the initial phase of the bout, prior to any response by the recipient). Data points represent individual grooming interactions. The dashed line is the relationship predicted by linear
mixed modelling (Table 3).
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episode length was related to the absolute rank of the highest-
ranked bystander but not to the difference in rank between this
individual and the current recipient. It is evident that groomers
were able to recognize and respond to this difference, as they
adjusted their grooming effort accordingly.
That said, vigilance-against-aggression and parcelling-to-
encourage-cooperation may be difﬁcult to distinguish in practice,
and may not be mutually exclusive: to determine risks of defection,
a groomer needs to monitor the immediate social environment, i.e.
be vigilant. If the necessary information is gained via the proxy of
subgroup composition, and if both forms of risk are posed by high-
ranking males, vigilant individuals inevitably gain information on
the risks of both aggression and defection simultaneously
(although we note that only 6% of grooming bouts in our data set
were interrupted by aggression). Further work will need to estab-
lish the proximate drivers of vigilance, for example how this
behaviour varies with changes in the composition of groups and in
relation to variation in the aggressiveness of other party members.
It may also be necessary to consider that partner choice decisions
may be inﬂuenced by the possibility of reciprocity across grooming
bouts (Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011).
Considering cooperation across a series of interactions raises the
notion of social relationships, so it is worth asking whether we can
explain our results from a relationship model paradigm. If chim-
panzees groom in order to form relationships that facilitate the
coalitional behaviour that aids rank acquisition (Gilby et al., 2013;
Nishida & Hosaka, 1996; de Waal, 1982), then they should prefer
to form relationships with high-ranking individuals, as these males
would provide the most effective support: this interpretation
would match with our ﬁndings. However, given that males should
compete to form such relationships, competitive exclusion should
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Figure 3. Inﬂuence of bystander rank relative to that of current recipient (rank of recipient  rank of highest ranked bystander) on the initial investment (duration of grooming, s)
in the bout by the groomer (the individual initiating the bout), prior to any response by the recipient. Data points represent individual grooming interactions. The dashed line is the
























Figure 4. Inﬂuence of the number of bystanders on the outcome of the initial phase of
grooming either a unidirectional bout, if the recipient does not participate, or bidi-
rectional, if the recipient reciprocates grooming to some degree (Table 4). The thick
bold line indicates the median, while the box represents 25th and 75th percentiles,
with whiskers indicating the range.
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result in a graded series of rank-matched relationships, with the
most effective partner available being limited to a male of adjacent
rank (cf. Seyfarth, 1977). That is, where there is competition for
social partners, the relationship paradigm should predict support-
ive relationships between adjacently ranked individuals. While
male chimpanzees do show enduring (multiyear) relationships
characterized by highly reciprocal grooming (Gilby & Wrangham,
2008; Mitani, 2009b; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011), such dyads are
not sorted strictly by rank. For example, Mitani (2009) showed that
rank did not affect how enduring such relationships were, and
while he reported that stronger grooming reciprocity existed be-
tween males of the same rank class, Newton-Fisher and Lee (2011)
used individual level rankings to show that males close in social
rank did not have more reciprocal grooming relationships. In
addition, these relationships can persist over longer timescales
than many shifts in social rank, which can change within as well as
between years, and it seems difﬁcult to reconcile grooming in-
vestment in particular social partners across multiple years with an
effort to secure the most powerful coalition partners.
Furthermore, these enduring relationships may not be all they
appear to be. In both our study of chimpanzees from the Mahale
Mountains National Park (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2016a) and in
this study, we found no evidence that initial-phase grooming
partner choice/control decisions were inﬂuenced by prior groom-
ing history: the grooming male showed no evidence of trust that
grooming would be reciprocated, even if that dyad had a prior
history of strongly reciprocal grooming. Deﬁned as a summary of a
set of interactions, essentially, the interaction history, between
particular individuals (Hinde, 1976), the term relationship in and of
itself implies no functional consequence: it is descriptive and
proximate. If interaction history does not inﬂuence grooming de-
cisions, it seems unlikely that such relationships have much to do
with building or exploiting trust.
Finally, it has also been argued (Boehm, 1999; Flack & de Waal,
2004; de Waal, 1996) that coalitional behaviour (facilitated by re-
lationships according to the paradigm) between subordinate male
chimpanzees serves to limit the despotism of the alpha male: if this
is true, more or less any adult male should be an effective coalition
partner, and attraction to high-ranked males as potential relation-
ship (and thus coalition) partners would cease to be a prediction of
the model, at least as applied to male chimpanzees.
Thus the rank effects that we report here are neither explicable
by nor, in fact, should be predictions of the relationship model, as
high-ranking bystanders should not generate temptations to defect
from current social partners. On the other hand, under a model of
direct economic exchange (e.g. grooming for agonistic support)
low-ranking males can engage in out-bidding competition (as
grooming is not rank restricted and can be provided by any indi-
vidual) and so they are not excluded from gaining access to rank-
restricted or rank-related commodities. In a structurally despotic
society, high-ranking individuals should consistently generate
temptations to defect from the current partner, which is precisely
what we ﬁnd. Our data on grooming decisions are not consistent
with the trust-building, relationship model paradigm, but are
consistent with a more direct economic beneﬁt, markets-based,
approach. That said, afﬁliative relationships, sometimes with
strongly reciprocal grooming, are widely reported in nonhuman
primates (Silk, Cheney, & Seyfarth, 2013). Explaining these remains
a challenge for economic models, particularly where relationships
form between unrelated individuals who are otherwise reproduc-
tive rivals, as among male chimpanzees (Newton-Fisher, 2014).
Overall, our data show that bystander effects and parcelling
during the initiation phase of grooming bouts among male chim-
panzees persist despite variation in the steepness of the dominance
hierarchy, but that relative dominance rank (a marker of partner
quality) becomes more signiﬁcant than the number of bystanders
under structural despotism. Studies of cooperation across taxa will
need to be mindful of both bystander effects, which may incorpo-
rate both number and quality of potential partners, and variation in
these associated with the degree of structural despotism/egalitar-
ianism. In addition, future tests of biological markets theory will
need to allow for the existence of local markets, with more work
necessary, in particular, on identifying and quantifying sampling
costs and on examining the extent that local markets are isolated
from, or embedded within, wider global marketplaces.
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